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This note examines the instrumental variables method used by Neumark, Zhang,
and Ciccarella (2005) to analyze Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on retail labor markets, and
exposes major ﬂaws in that methodology. Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella use
an interaction between distance from Wal-Mart’s headquarters and time eﬀects
to predict Wal-Mart’s presence in a county, and ﬁnd that each Wal-Mart store
destroys, on average, approximately 200 retail jobs. These ﬁndings are in stark
contrast to Basker (2005) who found a small, but positive and statistically signif-
icant, eﬀect on jobs. I show that the IV estimates obtained by Neumark, Zhang,
and Ciccarella confound Wal-Mart’s causal eﬀect with other factors. To illustrate
the problem, I show that their methodology implies a large impact of Wal-Mart
not only on retail employment but also on county manufacturing employment.
Reduced-form estimates of the regressions show statistically and economically in-
distinguishable eﬀects in counties with and without Wal-Mart presence, implying
that other factors are most likely driving the results.
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Several recent papers have attempted to estimate the eﬀect of Wal-Mart’s entry and ex-
pansion on retail labor markets, noting the likely endogeneity bias of OLS estimates. Since
Wal-Mart is more likely to enter thriving, growing markets than foundering, declining ones,
OLS estimates that show a positive relationship between Wal-Mart’s entry and retail em-
ployment cannot be interpreted causally. Basker (2005) attempts to circumvent this problem
using an instrument that proxies for a store’s initial planning date; she argues that while the
exact timing of a store’s opening can be manipulated to coincide with favorable conditions,
planning is done suﬃciently in advance that it is not likely to be endogenous to a growth
spurt — or sudden decline — exactly coinciding with Wal-Mart’s entry. Her results show a
small but and statistically-signiﬁcant long-run increase in retail jobs at the county level. A
key limitation of this IV strategy is that the instrument (store planning date) is only deﬁned
for locations in which a Wal-Mart store was eventually opened, limiting inference about the
impact of a Wal-Mart store on locations that have not received a store.
Two recent papers tackle this problem by noting Wal-Mart’s spatial pattern of expansion
(ﬁrst noted by Graﬀ and Ashton, 1994), in growing concentric circles around Bentonville,
Arkansas (the location of Wal-Mart’s company headquarters). In independent work, Dube,
Eidlin, and Lester (2005) and Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2005) (hereafter, NZC)
exploit the fact that counties enter Wal-Mart’s sphere at diﬀerent times, depending on their
distance from Northwestern Arkansas. Dube, Eidlin, and Lester focus on Wal-Mart’s eﬀects
on retail workers’ earnings, and distinguish between metropolitan areas (where they ﬁnd
a negative eﬀect) and rural counties (where they ﬁnd mixed results). NZC estimate Wal-
Mart’s eﬀects on both retail earnings and on retail employment; like Dube, Eidlin, and
Lester, they ﬁnd a negative eﬀect on earnings, and also ﬁnd a large and negative eﬀect on
retail employment.
The distance instrument is intuitively appealing since it is clearly exogenous to Wal-
Mart’s entry, and is potentially much more powerful than the planning date used by Basker
1because it captures an “intent to treat” and therefore, in principle, allows estimating what
Imbens and Angrist (1994) call a “local average treatment eﬀect.” This note, however, ar-
gues that the instrument is not valid because it is correlated with other spatial patterns. As
a result, coeﬃcient estimates from these IV regressions are not interpretable, and provide
less information about Wal-Mart’s eﬀects than Basker’s original estimates. I show that the
distance instrument fails elementary robustness checks and leads to implausible results in
counterfactual exercises, including a massive increase in a county’s manufacturing employ-
ment.
Distance has been used as an instrument in several other contexts, always controversially.
In the macroeconomics literature, distance to the equator has been used to identify the
eﬀect of European settlement on development (see, for example Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson, 2001). While there is little doubt that distance is indeed exogenous, it may
be correlated with other factors that aﬀect outcomes, and if these are not — or cannot
be — properly controlled, the instrumental-variables estimate confounds the eﬀect of the
mechanism of interest (European settlement, e.g.) with the eﬀects of other mechanisms that
are also correlated with the instrument. Sachs (2003) makes the argument, for example, that
distance to the equator is correlated with the incidence of malaria, which can have a direct
eﬀect on economic growth.1
The same problem arises when distance to Benton County, Arkansas, is used to identify
the eﬀect of Wal-Mart’s entry on employment and earnings outcomes. Benton County is lo-
cated in the northwest corner of Arkansas, roughly equidistant from Los Angeles and Boston
(1300 miles), and from Philadelphia and Phoenix (1000 miles). Population centers are gen-
1In labor economics, distance to schools has been used to identify the eﬀect of schooling on earnings (see,
e.g., Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2002) for Catholic schools, Maluccio (1998) for secondary schooling, Kane
and Rouse (1993) for college). But in those cases the argument for exogeneity is weaker, because people
can move to locate nearer to, or further from, a school; it is perhaps instructive that studies that use other
instruments, such as compulsory schooling laws (e.g., Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000) ﬁnd much smaller eﬀects
than studies using distance instruments. In contrast, the distance between counties, or countries, is ﬁxed
and not responsive to incentives.
2erally located closer to the coasts; while the median county is 600 miles from Benton County,
only four of the densest 30 counties in 1970 were located within 600 miles of Benton County.
If population density aﬀected only the level of retail employment per capita, this problem
could be addressed by using county ﬁxed eﬀects. But urban and rural areas specialize in
diﬀerent industries (Holmes and Stevens, 2004) and have been growing at diﬀerent rates
(Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2003); they are also quite likely to experience diﬀerent economic
cycles. These diﬀerential economic cycles — hitting at diﬀerent times and with diﬀerent
magnitudes — could spuriously show up as diﬀerences due to Wal-Mart’s expansion. I ﬁnd
some evidence that this, in fact, the case.
One standard approach to testing the validity of an instrument is to use overidentifying
restrictions, but given the diﬃculty of ﬁnding plausible restrictions, I do not attempt this kind
of test. There are, nevertheless, some standard tools that can be used to check instruments:
counterfactual analysis being the most important. (Basker, 2005, for example, estimates the
eﬀect of Wal-Mart’s entry on employment in automobile dealerships and service stations,
and in manufacturing, to help establish the validity of her instrument.) Another standard
tool is robustness analysis: the validity of an instrument is called into question if results
change dramatically when small changes are made to the sample or functional form. The
distance instrument does not pass either of these tests.2
The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Basker’s (2005) and
NZC’s methodologies and summarizes their results.3 Section 3 reports on my replications and
2The ﬁrst stage regressions are invariably strong as measured by F statistics, so the problem is unlikely to
be the traditional “weak instruments” problem discussed by Staiger and Stock (1997), Hahn and Hausman
(2002), and elsewhere. Rather, the issue is that the instrument appears to be correlated with the error term,
resulting in biased and inconsistent IV estimates. The problem of invalid instruments is discussed in detail
by Hahn and Hausman (2003), who note that 2SLS estimates may be even more biased than OLS estimates
when instruments are correlated with the error term. I ignore ﬁnite-sample bias in this note because sample
sizes are fairly large (tens of thousands of observations).
3I focus here on NZC rather than Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2005) because NZC use County Business
Patterns data, following Basker (2005), and speciﬁcally consider the impact on jobs. Dube, Eidlin, and
Lester use data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages to estimate the impact on earnings
only. Many, but not all, of the methodological issues discussed here apply also to Dube, Eidlin, and Lester
(2005). I do not consider the eﬀect on earnings because without controls for worker and job characteristics,
3extensions of NZC’s results, and discusses their sensitivity to sample deﬁnition and functional
form. I also perform some counterfactual analyses and determine, for example, that their
speciﬁcation implies not only a loss of 50-300 retail jobs in a county but also an increase of
500-600 manufacturing jobs in the same county. This number is highly implausible given the
fact that Wal-Mart’s procurement is done on a national and international scale. Section 4
examines functional form problems in more detail and discusses possible explanations for the




Basker (2005) uses a balanced panel of 1,749 counties over 23 years from 1977-1999.4 For
each county, she uses retail employment as of the week of March 12 from County Business
Patterns, and the number of Wal-Mart stores from various public sources, including company
annual reports, the annual publication Directory of Discount Department Stores, and the
Wal-Mart editions of the Rand McNally Road Atlas, which (since 1995) contain a list of
existing Wal-Mart store locations. Because the public data sources contain errors, she uses
company-assigned store numbers to proxy for stores’ planning dates. Taking the number
of stores that opened each year as exogenous, she assigns “planning years” for stores in
sequential order by number: the ﬁrst store in 1962, the next two stores in 1964, and so
on, based on the actual number of stores that opened each year. These ﬁgures are then
aggregated to the county level for the instrument: the number of stores that would have
such as education, hours, and responsibilities, which are not available in either data set, these eﬀects are
diﬃcult to interpret.
4The 1,749 counties are selected from over 3,000 US counties in the contiguous 48 states if they match three
criteria: aggregate employment of at least 1,500 in 1964; positive aggregate employment growth between
1964 and 1977; and no Wal-Mart entry prior to 1977.
4existed in a county in a given year, if stores had opened in the order in which they were
numbered, holding the actual number of stores opening in each year ﬁxed.
Basker argues that this instrument can also address endogeneity concerns, because plan-
ning is done too far in advance to foresee high-frequency employment ﬂuctuations. Wal-Mart
may take advantage of low-frequency trends in retail employment, however, which would
bias any once-and-for-all estimate of Wal-Mart’s impact on retail employment. To check
this, Basker uses an event-study speciﬁcation with a ﬁve-year window before and after Wal-
Mart’s entry: the lead coeﬃcients are intended to capture any trend in retail employment















popjt is retail employment per capita in county j in year t, γj and δt are county and
year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively;5 Wal-Martjt
popjt is the number of new Wal-Mart stores per capita
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where L is the lag operator and F is the lead operator. Because both retail employment
(on the LHS) and the Wal-Mart variables (on the RHS) are given in per-capita terms, the
coeﬃcient vector θ can be interpreted as jobs gained (or lost).6
Results from the OLS speciﬁcation and the IV speciﬁcation in which the counterfactual
number of new Wal-Mart stores instruments for the actual number (inferred from store
5Basker interacts the year ﬁxed eﬀects with an urbanization indicator, but this does not aﬀect the results
qualitatively.
6This speciﬁcation allows the year ﬁxed eﬀects to have a proportional eﬀect on all counties, while the
Wal-Mart variable has a constant level eﬀect independent of county size.
5lists) are presented graphically in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, reproduced from Basker
(2005). In each case, the solid line shows point estimates, and the dotted lines show the
95% conﬁdence interval. The OLS coeﬃcients are positive both before and after Wal-Mart’s
entry, and show an increase in the year before Wal-Mart’s entry (year 0) as well as the
year after entry, followed by a modest (and statistically insigniﬁcant) decline. The fact that
employment appears to be increasing before Wal-Mart’s entry is a cause for concern, because
it suggests one of two problems with the estimation: measurement error in opening dates
(so that some stores appear in store lists a year after they actually opened) or endogeneity.
In the latter case, Wal-Mart may observe an increase in retail employment and open a store
the following year, in which case the increase in retail employment between years 0 and 1
cannot be attributed to Wal-Mart alone. The IV estimates address these concerns. With
measurement error corrected, we still see an increase in employment between years (-1) and
0, but it is small relative to the post-entry increase, and statistically indistinguishable from
zero. Employment increases by 100 jobs between years 0 and 1. Following Wal-Mart’s
entry, retail employment declines sharply as competitors close or cut back employment, then
stabilizes, with a net eﬀect ﬁve years after entry of approximately 50 retail jobs gained.
By its nature, Basker’s instrument is only deﬁned for counties with a Wal-Mart store.
Basker argues that the sample selection addresses the problem of Wal-Mart’s likely preference
for growing counties: 75% of the counties in the sample had a Wal-Mart store open during
the sample period, compared with only 13% of the excluded counties. If Wal-Mart’s eﬀect is
similar across county sizes and types, then its eﬀect on smaller and declining counties may
be inferred from her estimates.
2.2 Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2005)
NZC attempt to address the endogeneity in both the location of Wal-Mart’s stores and the
timing of entry using Wal-Mart’s geographic pattern of expansion as an instrument capturing
“intent to treat.” To illustrate the instrument, I show Wal-Mart’s store locations in 6-year
6intervals — 1977, 1983, 1989 and 1995 — in Figure 3. NZC use this pattern to predict
Wal-Mart’s presence in a county.7 The IV strategy uses 19 instruments: distance (of each
county centroid) from Benton County, Arkansas, interacted with 19 year indicators. The
ﬁrst stage joint F statistic is highly signiﬁcant, except in some cases when the regressions
are estimated separately by region.
NZC’s data diﬀer from Basker’s in two important respects: the source of the Wal-Mart
data, and the sample selection. NZC obtained a list of all Wal-Mart store locations, with
their opening dates, from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.; the resulting data set is virtually free
of measurement error. (In an appendix, NZC document some of the measurement error
problems with the Basker data. I note here that qualitative results are invariant to the data
source; in Appendix A I document the diﬀerences between the two data sets in detail.)
Because their instrument is deﬁned for all counties, and not only for counties that
received a Wal-Mart store, their sample in principle could include all US counties. They end
their sample period in 1995 because Wal-Mart’s expansion reached the coasts by that time,
weakening the instrument’s predictive power. Although up to 3,032 counties are included in
the sample at some point during this 19 year period, the sample is unbalanced and averages
2,699 counties per year. This restriction is due to omission of any county-year observation
in which either data on retail employment or (more often) aggregate retail earnings are
suppressed.8,9
7Holmes (2005) argues that this expansion strategy increased Wal-Mart’s proﬁtability due to savings
associated with “economies of density.”
8The paper actually lists three samples, A, B, and C. I restrict my attention to Sample A because it is
the largest, and the one the authors focus on for the purpose of addressing employment.
9Data suppression is done to prevent disclosure of details regarding individual businesses. When data
are suppressed, every data point is replaced with a range: e.g., 1-19 employees instead of 7 employees. Data
suppression is more likely for small counties in which there are only a few retail establishments. Interestingly,
Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2005), using an empirical strategy very similar to NZC’s, but diﬀerent data, ﬁnd
that Wal-Mart’s impact on retail earnings is positive in rural counties, but negative in metropolitan counties,










δt + φ · exposurejt + εjt (1)
where all variables are as deﬁned above, except the Wal-Mart variable, exposurejt, which I
discuss below. The ﬁrst stage regression is









ρt · distancej + εjt (2)
where distancej is the distance in miles from county j to Benton County, Arkansas; the
coeﬃcient ρt takes on a diﬀerent value every year, allowing the eﬀect of distance to change
over time.
Some functional form diﬀerences between Basker’s (2005) and NZC’s analysis are driven
by the nature of the instruments. Basker’s instrument lends itself easily to a case-study
speciﬁcation, because it precisely predicts the opening date of stores; concerns about the
imperfect nature of the instrument increase the importance of checking for increases in em-
ployment in the years leading to Wal-Mart’s entry. Because Wal-Mart’s expansion pattern
consisted of “spreading out, then ﬁlling in” (Sam Walton, cited in NZC, page 3), simultane-
ously reaching new territory and adding stores in closer counties, NZC’s instrument is not
as ﬁne tuned. They argue that separately identifying leads and lags of the entry variable is
impractical because they are high correlated (footnote 39, page 28).
The Wal-Mart variable, “exposure,” is deﬁned as the sum of the ages of all Wal-Mart
stores in the county. For example, if there are two stores in a given county, one ﬁve years old
and the other twelve years old, the county’s “exposure” to Wal-Mart is 5 + 12 = 17. This
functional form restricts the additional eﬀect of an existing Wal-Mart store in its 10th year
of operation to be the same as the eﬀect of an initial entry.10 To interpret the results, NZC
10NZC justify this speciﬁcation saying that the alternative measure — a count of stores — produced “IV
8evaluate the predicted eﬀect at the mean level of exposure in the sample.
Equation (1) also constrains the eﬀect of a store (or a year of exposure) to be constant
per capita across small and large counties. While Wal-Mart stores vary in size, the range
over which they vary is several orders of magnitude smaller than the range of diﬀerences
in the size of counties; in practice, all the identiﬁcation is coming from smaller counties.11
Interpreting the estimation results at the mean (by multiplying the coeﬃcient by the average
population in the sample), NZC’s OLS estimates of Equation (1) correspond to an increase
of approximately 20 jobs per year of “exposure” to Wal-Mart; at mean county exposure, this
implies a statistically-signiﬁcant increase of 160 retail jobs. IV estimates, in contrast, are
sharply negative: they show a decrease of approximately 35 retail jobs per year of exposure,
or approximately 280 jobs for the average exposure period.
In the next section, I replicate these results with some minor changes and analyze their
sensitivity to changes in functional form and sample selection criteria. I then perform a
counterfactual analysis by using the same methodology to estimate Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on
county manufacturing employment.
3 Replication and Extension
3.1 Replication
I use administrative data from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. to estimate Equation (1). Following
NZC, I limit the sample to the period 1977-1995, although I include all counties in the
regressions.12 I use both NZC’s measure of exposure and the more transparent number of
estimates of the overall employment eﬀects were implausibly large (and negative)” (footnote 39, page 28). I
return to this point in Section 4.
11In 1977, the 95th percentile county by population was 100 times larger than the 5th percentile county by
population. Exact employment per Wal-Mart store is not known, but the diﬀerence is unlikely to be larger
than 5-fold.
12My sample includes 57,855 observations, or 3,045 counties over 19 years. NZC’s “A sample” includes
51,274 observations. 261 counties have retail employment suppressed at some point during the sample period.
Of these, 88 have a single instance of suppression, and another 56 have two instances each. In cases of data
9stores as endogenous RHS variables.13 Results are shown in Panel A of Table 1; both OLS
and IV results conform with those reported in NZC. Remaining diﬀerences are most likely
due to the slightly altered sample.
Evaluating the OLS coeﬃcients at the sample means of population (77,700) and exposure
(9.6), the average eﬀect of a Wal-Mart store, using the exposure measure, is estimated to be
a gain of 143 retail jobs. IV estimates of the same speciﬁcation imply a loss of 164 jobs. The
corresponding ﬁgures for the speciﬁcation using the number of Wal-Mart stores in the county
are 105 jobs gained (OLS) and 462 jobs lost (IV). The large diﬀerence between the exposure
and stores IV results is in keeping with NZC’s contention that the stores speciﬁcation results
in “implausibly large” coeﬃcients (footnote 39, page 28).
3.2 Normalization
Given the highly skewed distribution of both exposure and population, it is probably better
to use median rather than means to evaluate the coeﬃcients. The 1995 (the last year of the
sample period) median exposure, conditional on at least one Wal-Mart store in the county,
is 11; median sample population in 1995 is approximately 23,000. At the median, then, IV
estimates for the exposure speciﬁcation in Panel A of Table 1 imply a loss of 5 retail jobs
per year of exposure, or 55 jobs for the median county with a Wal-Mart store in 1995. The
stores speciﬁcation implies a loss of 137 retail jobs per Wal-Mart store.
But since Wal-Mart’s per-capita eﬀect in diﬀerent markets is likely to be inversely related
to the size of the market, a better solution is to use a functional form that allows stores to
have a ﬁxed level eﬀect on employment. To do this, I normalize the Wal-Mart variable
(number of stores or exposure to Wal-Mart) by population, as in Basker (2005). In Panel B
suppression, I replace the suppressed value with the mean employment for non-suppressed counties in the
same range: 13 for 1-19 employees, 64 for 20-99 employees, and so on.
13As in NZC and Basker (2005), standard errors are clustered at the county level.













where Wal-Martjt is either the number of Wal-Mart stores in county j at time t or county
j’s exposure to Wal-Mart (sum of store ages) as of time t. The coeﬃcient φ is directly
interpretable as the average eﬀect of a Wal-Mart store on retail employment, or the average
eﬀect of one year of exposure to Wal-Mart, depending on the speciﬁcation.
Focusing on the IV estimates, an average year of exposure leads to a loss of about 6
retail jobs (or about 67 jobs for the median county with a Wal-Mart store in 1995); the
per-store eﬀect is much larger — a loss of 283 jobs.
3.3 Counterfactual Analyses
3.3.1 Timing
Since the instrument is not precise enough to allow separate estimation of pre- and post-
entry eﬀects, I employ an indirect test. I “pre-date” the opening of each Wal-Mart store by
2 years, and re-estimate Equations (1) and (3). Since two years of the pre-entry period are
now confounded with the post-entry period, if the estimated decline in employment is due
to Wal-Mart’s entry and not other, coincident, factors, we should see estimated coeﬃcients
drop towards zero (as we would in any case of measurement error).
Results from this exercise are shown in Table 2. Panel A shows results for the original
NZC functional form which imposes a constant relative eﬀect of Wal-Mart regardless of
county size, and Panel B shows results that impose a constant absolute eﬀect. In Panel A,
OLS estimates are smaller, as expected; IV results for the exposure speciﬁcation, however,
show a larger coeﬃcient. Evaluated at the median 1995 population, the perturbed regression
shows a loss of 6.5 rather than 5 jobs for every year of exposure to Wal-Mart; since all stores
have been aged by 2 years in the sample, the median exposure in 1995 is 13 rather than
1111, implying an average job destruction of 84 jobs — 50% higher than the IV estimates of
the unperturbed regression. The stores speciﬁcation, in contrast, shows a smaller (absolute)
point estimate compared with the baseline regression, and implies a loss of 79 rather than
137 jobs. The results for the normalized speciﬁcation in Panel B are even more striking: IV
estimates for both the exposure and the stores speciﬁcations are larger than those in Table
1. The exposure speciﬁcation shows a loss of 6.6 rather than 6 jobs per year of exposure to
Wal-Mart, or 87 jobs at the median exposure level; and the stores speciﬁcation shows a loss
of 430 jobs per store, 50% larger than before.
Since measurement error leads to attenuated point estimates, the larger absolute value
of the estimates must be due to the bias introduced by changing stores’ opening dates. These
results suggest that the instrument is picking up pre-existing trends that are correlated with,
but not caused by, Wal-Mart’s expansion into a county.
3.3.2 Manufacturing
As a second counterfactual exercise, I estimate Wal-Mart’s impact on county-level manu-
facturing employment. Given the national and international character of Wal-Mart’s pro-
curement (Basker and Van, 2006), we do not expect to ﬁnd any eﬀect on manufacturing
employment at the county level. Basker (2005) reports no observed impact on manufactur-
ing employment (Figure 11, page 181).14
Results are displayed in Table 3. As before, Panel A shows estimates of Equation (1)
and Panel B shows estimates of Equation (3). In Panel A, OLS results for both the exposure
and stores speciﬁcations are negative, indicating that Wal-Mart appears to locate in counties
with relatively declining manufacturing sectors. The sign is reversed, however, for the IV
estimates of the exposure speciﬁcation: evaluated at the median 1995 population, each year
14Manufacturing employment is computed as the sum of employment across 2-digit manufacturing in-
dustries. Because each of these smaller sectors has a substantial amount of data suppression, the sum has
substantial measurement error. However, there is no reason to believe this measurement error is systemati-
cally correlated with the Wal-Mart variables.
12of exposure to Wal-Mart is estimated to create 46 jobs; with 11 years of exposure, this implies
a gain of 511 manufacturing jobs per county attributed to Wal-Mart. The stores speciﬁcation
has smaller, but still quite large, opposite-sign results. If this speciﬁcation is to be believed,
each Wal-Mart store is responsible for a loss of 231 manufacturing jobs in the county. In
Panel B, OLS results are positive, and both IV estimates are positive: a Wal-Mart store
creates, on average, 630 manufacturing jobs, or 60 manufacturing jobs per year of exposure.
4 Discussion
4.1 Exposure
The diﬀerences in magnitudes across the exposure and stores speciﬁcations, along with the
inconsistent results of the counterfactual exercises, raise questions about the validity of the
baseline estimates. One reason for these problems is that the exposure variable artiﬁcially
prolongs the relationship between distance and Wal-Mart’s presence. As the stock of stores
in the area immediately around Bentonville ages, it continues to be over-weighted relative to
areas receiving stores for the ﬁrst time. Thus, older stores in proximate locations contribute
to the exposure of nearby locations long after they are outnumbered by more distant stores.15
NZC’s claim that the “identiﬁcation strategy works much better for the exposure measure”
than for a count of stores (footnote 39, page 28) has some support — ﬁrst stage F statistics
are roughly 50% larger for the exposure speciﬁcations — but ﬁrst-stage results are strong
across the board.
In any given year t, aggregate exposure (and exposure at each county) increases for two
reasons: ﬁrst, the existing stock of stores ages by one year; and second, new stores are added
to the stock. If the existing stock of exposure is exposuret−1, and a total newt new stores
15This over-weighting of proximate counties could be made to last even longer if we used the sum of
squared store ages instead of the sum of ages.




By construction, the ﬁrst store, opened in Rogers, Arkansas, in 1962, contributed 100% of
that year’s increase in exposure; the share of new stores is strictly lower for all subsequent
years. In 1977, for example, 158 existing stores all aged by one year, while 33 new stores
opened; new stores therefore constituted 17.3% of the total increase in exposure. The annual
contribution of new stores to exposure is shown, along with the number of new stores opened,
in Figure 4; between 1977 and 1995, the contribution of new stores to the overall increase in
exposure exceeded 25% only in 1981, the year Wal-Mart acquired 106 Kuhn’s Big K stores
in nine states. By 1995, the contribution of new stores to increased exposure fell below 5%.
Figure 5 plots the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for both the exposure (solid line) and stores
(dashed line) speciﬁcations. In each case, the coeﬃcient ρt on the interaction of distance
and year t indicator is given for each year 1978-1995 (the coeﬃcient on distance interacted
with the 1977 indicator is normalized to zero). The ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for the exposure
measure correspond closely to those plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 3 (page 37) of
NZC.
To interpret the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for the store speciﬁcation, recall that in the early
years (in the 1960s and early 1970s) Wal-Mart had very few stores anywhere; so distance from
Bentonville was a poor predictor of the locations of stores. As the chain expanded, building
up its presence in Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and nearby states, distance became a fairly
good predictor of store presence: the further away a location, the less likely it was to have a
Wal-Mart store. As Wal-Mart’s circle of stores expanded, however, this relationship between
store presence and distance has once again become weak. This non-monotonic relationship
between distance and the number of Wal-Mart stores shows up clearly in the ﬁgure. Until
1988, distance is increasingly negatively correlated with the number of stores in a county;
14after 1988, the relationship between the number of stores and distance starts to reverse itself.
By 1993, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is statistically indistinguishable from zero
(they are normalized to zero for 1977), and by 1995 it is statistically positive: relative to
1977, being far away from Bentonville is correlated with having more stores rather than
few stores. If we used the number of new stores rather than the number of existing stores,
as NZC’s Figure 2 (page 36) motivates us to do, we would ﬁnd a stagnant relationship
between distance and new store openings for the period 1977-1986, then a strong increasing
relationship between 1986-1992, followed by a stagnation and decline as new stores after
1992 are not located disproportionately in any distance ring.
The transformation of a count of stores to the exposure variable is not innocuous. Be-
cause the ﬁrst-stage coeﬃcients for exposure and stores move together for the ﬁrst part of the
sample, and in opposite directions for the second part, we can get IV estimates with diﬀerent
magnitudes and even diﬀerent signs (as in the case of the manufacturing regressions in Table
3 above) depending on whether the bulk of the variation used to identify the coeﬃcients is
from the ﬁrst or the second half of the sample period.
4.2 Identiﬁcation
If the problem were merely that the RHS variable is misspeciﬁed, the manufacturing regres-
sions shown in Table 3 would show no eﬀect of Wal-Mart on manufacturing employment —
at least for the normalized “stores” speciﬁcation in Panel B. The problem, as those regres-
sions demonstrate, is that Wal-Mart’s expansion pattern is correlated with other industry
trends.












ψt · distancej + εjt (4)
I show the coeﬃcients ψ1978 − ψ1995 in Figure 6. (Since the reduced-form equation does not
15include a Wal-Mart variable, these estimates do not depend on the deﬁnition of the Wal-Mart
variable.) The solid line shows coeﬃcient estimates from a regression that includes the full
sample of counties (3,045 observations per year). The dashed line shows coeﬃcients from a
speciﬁcation that used only the 1,537 counties with at least one Wal-Mart store by 1995; and
the dotted line shows coeﬃcients from a regression that includes only the remaining 1,508
counties with no Wal-Mart by 1995.
The reduced-form results show where the identiﬁcation of Wal-Mart’s impact comes
from in these speciﬁcations. Wal-Mart opened its ﬁrst stores in California, Pennsylvania,
and Nevada in 1990, and its ﬁrst Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Oregon, Maine, and
New Hampshire stores in 1992. At the same time, retail employment per capita, which had
been high in distant counties relative to close ones for several years, began to converge. NZC
are assuming that this relationship is due to Wal-Mart’s entry into these distant counties. A
major problem with this interpretation is the similarity between the patterns of the reduced-
form coeﬃcients for counties that never had a Wal-Mart store and counties that have had
one (at least until 1991, when they diverge). Whatever caused a relative drop in retail
employment per capita in “far” counties in 1985 caused it for both Wal-Mart and non-Wal-
Mart counties; the divergence between “close” and “far” counties between 1986 and 1989
also did not discriminate between “Wal-Mart counties” and those that never got a Wal-Mart
store.
One possibility is that diﬀerent counties are growing at diﬀerent rates, for reasons exoge-
nous to Wal-Mart’s presence. We could include county-speciﬁc linear trends in the regressions
along with county ﬁxed eﬀects (which allow diﬀerent levels of the intercept term), but this
is impractical for three reasons. First, as NZC would argue, these county trends may be (at
least partially) endogenous to Wal-Mart’s presence. Second, and more problematically, they
would be highly correlated with the instruments, leaving little variation in the instruments
for identiﬁcation. The remaining variation — after county-speciﬁc trends are “partialed out”
of the instruments — is the year-by-year deviations of Wal-Mart’s expansion path from a
16linear trend: these deviations are very likely to be endogenous to economic conditions in
the counties on its frontier of expansion. Finally, as the reduced-form results in Figure 6
demonstrate, trends may be insuﬃcient to address the problem, if the diﬀerences are caused
by diﬀerent timing and/or extent of economic ﬂuctuations.
If county-level trends must be excluded for the identiﬁcation strategy to work, we need
to look for speciﬁc culprits — variables correlated with distance from Benton County which
may have a direct eﬀect on the outcome variables, and for which we can control directly. I
oﬀer a couple of suggestions in the next section.
4.3 Possible Explanations
There are various possible reasons for the spurious results presented here. A major problem
with the use of distance from Bentonville as an instrument is that county characteristics
are spatially correlated. For example, in 1990, the correlation between a countys per-capita
manufacturing employment and average per-capita manufacturing employment in counties
within 100 miles was 0.58; it was 0.30 for per-capita retail employment, and 0.65 for log
population. That same year, the correlation between the number of Wal-Mart stores in a
county and the average number of stores in counties within 100 miles was 0.47. This, along
with spatial correlation in other variables, both observable and unobservable, is likely to be
a major part of the explanation.
One diﬀerence between “close” and “far” counties is their level of urbanization. As
noted in the Introduction, the major population centers are concentrated in a relatively
narrow distance band from Benton County — between 900 and 1,300 miles. This is shown
graphically in Figure 7. (Note that the scaling of population density changes at 10,000
people per square mile.) With the exception of St. Louis City, 272 miles from Benton
County with 10,000 people per square mile in 1970, virtually all dense population centers
are concentrated within the band 900-1,300 miles from Benton County. Because distance
from Bentonville is correlated with population density, so is the timing of Wal-Mart’s entry
17into a county. If business cycles reach dense and sparse counties at diﬀerent times, and with
diﬀerent consequences for retail employment, these diﬀerential eﬀects could be spuriously
attributed to Wal-Mart’s presence given its pattern of expansion.
I explore this explanation in several ways. First, I interact the year ﬁxed eﬀects with two
urbanization dummies following Basker (2005): one if the county was inside a 1960 MSA,
and another if it was outside, but within 20 miles of, a 1960 MSA. I also estimate the model
interacting year ﬁxed eﬀects with the 1970 population density. When the Wal-Mart variable
used is exposure, these alternative speciﬁcations (not shown) provide much smaller estimates
of φ (in absolute terms), and in some speciﬁcations φ becomes statistically insigniﬁcant; the
alternative speciﬁcations have little eﬀect on the more transparent stores speciﬁcation.
I also consider the possibility that “oil counties” — counties where the local economy
moves with oil prices, often in the opposite direction to the rest of the country — which are
mostly located close to Arkansas (primarily in Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana) were driving
the results. I estimate the regressions omitting counties in which the 1970 employment share
of the mining industry was above 10%, but found no statistically or economically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences with these counties omitted.16
There are other possible culprits, including diﬀerential economic trends and ﬂuctuations
due to diﬀerent industry mixes, income distributions, housing stocks, climate, and many
other variables. Investigating all of them is beyond the scope of this note; the main point
here is that many variables are distributed unevenly in a way that is correlated with distance
from Benton County.
16Following Buckley (2002), I use data from the 1970 Regional Economic Information System to determine
the mining share of employment. See http://www.bea.gov/bea/regional/reis/ for details.
185 Conclusion
The analysis presented here is not conclusive, but it demonstrates the sensitivity of the
results and the correlation of Wal-Mart’s expansion pattern with factors that may directly
aﬀect the evolution of retail employment per capita. Geographic/time series patterns of retail
employment are economically and statistically similar across counties with and without Wal-
Mart, suggesting that the instrument is picking up other factors rather than a causal eﬀect
of Wal-Mart. A counterfactual analysis that artiﬁcially ages each store by 2 years, adding
both noise and bias to the data, results in larger rather than smaller point estimates of
Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on retail employment. The IV estimates also show a systematic eﬀect of
Wal-Mart on county-level manufacturing employment which is substantially larger than the
eﬀect on retail employment.
NZC argue that almost any control variable in the regression could be endogenous due
to “the pattern of Wal-Mart’s growth, and its extensive penetration” (footnote 23, page 12).
The decision to omit control variables would be less problematic if their instruments were
uncorrelated with other exogenous patterns — if, for example, the reduced-form coeﬃcients
looked signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for counties with and without Wal-Mart stores. Since that is
not the case, it is impossible to determine econometrically the degree to which Wal-Mart has
shaped the diﬀerential retail employment patterns experienced by “near” and “far” counties.
Unfortunately, this leaves us still without a deﬁnitive answer for Wal-Mart’s impact.
The best evidence, though imperfect, comes from Basker (2005) and shows a small, but
positive, treatment eﬀect on the treated. More research is needed in order to uncover the
true eﬀect of Wal-Mart’s entry on local employment. In principle, a regression discontinuity
speciﬁcation could exploit the geographic pattern of expansion — using an instrument that
“turns on” when a county enters the “frontier zone” of Wal-Mart’s reach, and “turns oﬀ” a
year or two afterwards — although the ﬁrst counties to be treated are likely to be diﬀerent
from counties treated later on, in ways that are probably correlated with Wal-Mart’s impact.
More generally, this note makes the known, but often underappreciated, point that
19exogeneity does not automatically mean an instrument satisﬁes the exclusion restriction.
This point has been made by others in similar contexts; see Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2002)
for a discussion. Verifying that the instrument is not correlated with variables that can
directly aﬀect the outcome of interest is a ﬁrst-order requirement.
20A Data
As noted in Section 2, Basker (2005) and NZC use diﬀerent data sets to determine Wal-Mart’s
opening dates. In the note above, I have restricted myself to the oﬃcial “administrative”
data used by NZC, but since those data are not publicly available, I review the diﬀerences
between the two sources. The raw data used in Basker (2005) are available at
http://economics.missouri.edu/~baskere/data/.17
The administrative data ﬁle contains 10 stores which opened between 1977 and 1995
and which do not appear in the Basker data set. Of these, 9 have closing dates in the
administrative data set, and four of them closed within 2 years of opening. Basker omitted
stores that appeared in store lists for only one or two years as many of them were listed
in error, which accounts for some of these omissions. The Basker data set also includes 14
stores that never appear in the administrative data; all but two of these have a closing date
of 1993 in the Basker data — i.e., they appear in some editions of Chain Store Guides but
never in the Rand McNally Road Atlas.
Among the 2,096 stores with (true) opening dates between 1977 and 1995 that can be
matched across the two data sets, 1,198 (57%) have the same year of entry in both data sets,
and an additional 627 (30%) have opening years within one year. Only 33 stores (1.6%) have
an error of more than four years in the Basker opening date, although a handful of cases are
egregious, with opening dates for ﬁve stores oﬀ by 10 years or more. (The raw correlation
coeﬃcient between the two sets of opening years is 0.97.) Figure A-1 shows the distribution
of diﬀerences in opening dates for stores that opened between 1977 and 1995.18
Basker’s use of store numbers to construct the instrument reduces this measurement
17Following the posting of NZC, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. provided a spreadsheet with opening-date data
on its public relations web site, http://www.walmartfacts.com, but later modiﬁed the spreadsheet by
removing the opening dates.
18Many of these diﬀerence are due to the 1990-1993 period, for which entry dates in the Basker are imputed
using state totals, as explained in the Appendix to Basker (2005). When those years are excluded from the
comparison, 69% of stores have the same opening year assigned in both data sets, and 94% are within one
year.
21error considerably. Over the same time period (1977-1995), assigning store opening dates
based on store numbers results in the correct year for 1,352 stores (65%); errors between the
two are only weakly correlated (the raw correlation coeﬃcient for the errors is 0.27).
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28Table 1. Baseline Replication: Wal-Mart’s Eﬀect on Retail Employment
OLS IV OLS IV





First Stage F 32.6 25.0
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: LHS and RHS Normalized by Population
Exposure 6.1567*** -6.1220**
per Capita (1.2541) (2.9688)
Stores 93.9383*** -282.8821***
per Capita (12.8221) (52.8008)
First Stage F 38.4 22.2
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
Table 2. Counterfactual Exercise: Age Each Store by 2 Years
OLS IV OLS IV





First Stage F 37.0 23.5
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: LHS and RHS Normalized by Population
Exposure 6.9631*** -6.6503**
per Capita (1.2576) (2.8687)
Stores 89.6980*** -429.7978***
per Capita (12.0032) (59.4084)
First Stage F 38.2 19.7
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
29Table 3. Counterfactual Exercise: Wal-Mart’s Eﬀect on Manufacturing Employment
OLS IV OLS IV





First Stage F 32.8 25.1
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: LHS and RHS Normalized by Population
Exposure 13.7834*** 59.7388***
per Capita (2.1855) (4.8571)
Stores 39.7016** 629.6941***
per Capita (16.6328) (87.5268)
First Stage F 38.8 22.2
p Value 0.0000 0.0000
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